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Participants – non-Commission: Bill Black, (NSA-OGC)
Participants - Commission: Kevin Scheid, Col. Lorry Fenner
(U) BACKGROUND
(U) To avoid the draft, Mr. Black enlisted in the Army and was trained as a Russian linguist in Army Security Agency (ASA). He served from 1956-1959 and when he separated he went to work for NSA. He started as a linguist/analyst for 2-3 years, but gained a reputation for creating new things. He didn't stay a linguist long; he was drawn to analysis. Analysis at NSA is much more than language. He was placed in positions of increasing responsibility over the years of his long career. He served as White House liaison for a time and went to schools. He was in Europe in 1973. Later he was Chief of Operations for a time and then full-time. He also remained STRATCOM's SIGINT advisor. He returned in 2000 as the NSA Deputy Director. Mr. Black wanted us to know his bias so he told us his story of in July 1962 being assigned to work with CIA and the military services. They were running an experiment and he was one of the first NSA analysts they ever met. Truman wanted to create a national warning center after the Korean War. He was so disappointed in intelligence at the time because they had first said the North would not invade and later said China would not enter the war. He wanted a separate
discipline for warning. In the Korean War case the intelligence community only had two disciplines – Estimative or term (strategic analysis by the NIC in the form of NIEs) and Current Intelligence. Neither could do warning properly. Term could not recognize discontinuities on their targets and Current would just be crying wolf all the time. In fact all the White House got was current intelligence, but it was really designed for the field commander, it did not present a
whole picture. Black was trained by CIA and thought they were good. 9/11 Classified Information

	9/11 Classified Information Of course he was right.
	(U) Warning is a separate discipline it must see all and share all. But it should only do one thing — look for indications of danger. His training for the National Warning Center was to always assume an attack was coming and to always assume the other side would hide everything from you. The Center was started by Hitchcock and the second boss was Denny. They published an assessment once a week and when needed. The Center was the center of the "Watch Committee of the IC" which was chaired by the Deputy Director of CIA (Carter). It had a National Indications Watch. But unfortunately, other people decided the lessons-learned should lead to integrating Warning back into the other two disciplines and the NWC went away. Warning disappeared. Mr. Black's view is that the PDB and SIEB are current intelligence, not Warning. Those are all about crying wolf, so Truman's prediction came true.
	When Mr. Black returned to NSA after this tour he started the National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC, now the National Security Operations Center) from his own lessons learned. NSA at the time was doing only term studies, it had no current intelligence at all. He helped NSA go through its first big centralization. The Deputy of the Watch Committee became the Deputy Director of NSA so he had an ally. Before that the tactical commander had SIGINT units; now they were all pulled to NSAW. There was no place that the President could get the big picture from SIGINT before this since each tactical unit only supported its one commander. After they centralized they gave each commander a Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) to make up for taking away the SIGINT units in the field. This started the tradition they have returned to — support the Customer by living with and knowing the customer. So they created this end-to-end system for Collection and Support — "get it", "know it", "relate it" (or disseminate it). They created a "national" agency with lots of customers.
	(U) Mr. Black thinks TTIC could be an NWC but it would have to have that special frame of mind. They should give warning only to the White House and the head of CIA [DCI?]. The products of the NWC did not go to the current intelligence analysts; this information did not matter to them.
3	In the 1970s he was doing lots of SIGINT were doing it too – lots of HF/Morse Code – and there was lots of negotiating and it went to the Hill. Snodgrass told them there would be no money until they integrated their efforts. So he and a classmate from National War College started the
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After he found out, it wasn'	t an issues.				
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Mr. Black told us that 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Classified Information we have lots of collection and communications have exploded with the Information Revolution (global networks). Now the problem is not more or better collection but it's more about analysis. 9/11 Classified Information					
The current NSA transformation is like the centralization of the 1960s. IT now dominates the world. In 2000 he was hired to help NSA transform from analog to digital. The Industrial Age challenge was outer-space and the nation's response was NASA. For the Information Age the challenge is cyberspace and the nation's response is unsure. NSA is working hard with IAD and DoD funding and exploitation with NFIP funds, and a mix of Armed Service funds to show the nation that NSA is the answer to the Information Age challenge.					
were still working the Russia need cyberspace". Mr. Blac he said, make me a special a	k knew that LtGen Minihan was com	SA VADM McConnell said "we ing to be the next DIRNSA and			
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	Deputy SECDEF. Now IW belongs to STRATCOM. Mr. Black has been their SIGINT advisor since 1992 even while he was retired.
	When asked about CT at NSA, particular the Agency's posture when he returned in 2000 (in relation to the 1998 East Africa and 2000 Cole bombings), he said he was charged to look at the organizational underpinning rather than particular missions. DIRNSA had a vision for the future and he needed an "insider" to push it and give energetic follow-up so he asked Black to return from retirement. (1) He helped reorganize NSA into "Get it, Know it, Relate it". (2) He advised putting the Agency's top analyst (Maureen Baginski) in charge of the Signal Intelligence Directorate (SID) handling Operations and Science and Technology because collection was not a problem, analysis was. They were flooded with information. In addition, technology and remoting had caused analysts to also be collectors or collection managers. (3) He had to take a system that was geared
ſ	(and that is a CT problem). They needed to define a new set
•	of indicators. They needed to figure out how to access and analyze what they needed
	He asked whether we had seen their "reference model" of collecting data and
	processing it to make information; and analyzing it to create knowledge; and then analyzing it
	further to create intelligence – and sharing these (data, information, knowledge and intelligence at each level to the customers who work with it at the various levels. (4)
	Destroy the fiefdoms. They were stovepiped within the agency by analytic product line (The
	Offices of Primary Interest - TOPIs ruled). He quoted Jane Armstrong as saying we've gone
	from a system of "need to know" to a system of "need to share". He reminded us that as far as
	high priority targets went, CT was not the only one; in fact, NSA was highly focused on
	After 9/11 they decided they were on the right track with transformation but were behind the power curve. They needed to continue the changes/transformation and he was to push it even
	harder.
	When asked about the DCI's direction on priorities, Mr. Black responded that NSA was
	working CT. NSA put people in
•	every new DCI Center. They had learned not to ask the customer for their requirements but to send people to live with them and help them determine what they needed. He charged his
	detailees to get to know the "weapon" and the customer so they could serve them better. If
	anyone asked the NSA person who they worked for they were to respond to the asker, whoever
	they were, "I work for you."
	Trailblazer? After bemoaning how staffers run the world, Mr. Black said that when NSA
	was trying to move from the analog environment to the digital environment they needed to make
	a sea-change in analytic techniques. 9/11 Classified Information
	9/11 Classified Information Mr. Black was reading everything he could at this
	time on complexity and chaos theories to help with this new analysis. DIRNSA Hayden also
	knew Information Warfare from his Air Intelligence Agency/Air Force Information Warfare
	Center/Joint Information Warfare Center days. They needed to build the capability to handle both worlds but especially the digital.
	both worlds out especially the digital.
1	NSA looked to industry to determine how to transform. The Saturn company had done it by
	moving away from Detroit and other auto manufacturers to make change from outside. IBM

tried to do it inside and ended up not doing it very well or very quickly and spawned its greatest
competitor, Microsoft. Before he came back, NSA decided to try inside change as well. They
had to make this major transformation with less people and less money. They wanted to see
what they could buy instead of make in the ".com" era of information technology revolution. If
NSA wasn't on the advanced edge of technology they'd go and buy it. They didn't bring
industry in, which bothered some people. (1)
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Theoretically, by buying a company they
also bought a congressman in whose district a company resides. (2) The other option they tried was to say to industry "this is my problem – transformation to the digital age – give me a
solution." They advertised for RFPs and got TRAILBLAZER. They developed 3 concepts but
were a year behind. NSA wanted the companies to keep competing, but they complained about
not having the people and money to stay on task without being brought in fully. In addition,
Congress kept asking – what do you have to show for this big program. So NSA decided they
had to show some short-term gains so they worked for spin-offs from the original
TRAILBLAZER long term transformation contract/approach. They have a whole number that
he wanted us to have a list of, and he described how they helped CT. They got a Test and
Evaluation Center which helps the entire enterprise: they got analysis tools which
was their first focus: the got a which helps with the CT target: they got 9/11 Classified Information
target, they get
9/11 Classified Information and they sought to reform their National SIGINT Requirements Process among others. Then they looked at where the best home would
be for TRAILBLAZER and decided it should be their new organization called IT IS (Informatio
Technology and Information Systems) – to address all the NSA infrastructure issues. Mr. Black
drew a picture that he wanted to build a system which would take in all types of collection –
digital and analog – from every system and platform and source. Then it would be processed by
this machine which would route it to the people who needed it to translate languages, do
computer analysis, etc. And the whole system would be searchable at multilevel security levels
for every user - analysts; policy makers, etc. He also got INNOVISION, an analytic lab, out of
TRAILBLAZER with a 9/11 Classified Information They got that with
over-guidance. He confirmed that TRAILBLAZER was first meant to address the
problem but now has been used to address the CT problem with its many spin-offs like
the DNE Viewer. Incidentally when NSA posed it's problem to industry for them to come up
with a solution, the common response was "that's hard."
(U) Mr. Black believes Oversight would be most useful if it just gave general direction and lega
advice; it should simply communicate the intent of Congress. But they are not supposed to
manage his program or do his job. They are not supposed to build carburetors. The staffs of the Intelligence Committees are professional staffs; he thinks they should be the staffs of the
individual Senators and Congressmen on the committees and they could be cleared. He would
know how to work with them better then. It is like Industry – assigned to a specific
congressman.
Congressing).
(U) Mr. Black said that NSA was caught in DoD worries about Homeland Security. DoD feels
like its money is being used to support a new customer. For every new customer NSA needs to
get with them and understand their requirements and teach them what NSA can do for them. So

they need a CSG just like everywhere else so they can sort out their future posturing. Since their support to HLS is seen exclusively in the Infrastructure Protection area this is primarily related not to SID but to the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD). IAD is funded through ISP, not with CCP monies and therefore it is all DoD funding. DoD is upset. Mr. Black did not know the terminology, DHS/IAIP and could not articulate any NSA support for IA, or domestic intelligence. (He did say that Mr. Ridge and the IAD Director, Mr. Wolfe, went to highschool together.) He said his bias against an NSA role in domestic intelligence is formed by experiences in the Nixon era. Still he admitted NSA supports the Secret Service which is now part of DHS. He said it's hard to keep straight what DHS has/is now. He did not address the issue of foreign and domestic intelligence being combined or an MI-5 type organization. (U) Mr. Black said that NSA constantly passed off information to the FBI Since 9/11 they have worked even more closely. Both organizations are more sensitive now. They make more sure that what they've sent actually gets there rather than just passing it off. They have always had a CSG at FBI HQ but now they are more active. What they learned is that FBI is so decentralized that the Washington Field Office is not the same as Headquarters. They have increased their security and protection with the FBI since 9/11. They sent their best, Baginski, over and that is working out well.				
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Legal and policy issues are managed by DoJ.				
Bogar and policy issues are managed by Bot.				
Linguists: To build a 3/3 linguist (listening and reading capability) into a cryptologic linguist takes another 18 months. So from school it takes 3-5 years total.				
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NSA and the IC have decided that some of				
its best products are SIGINT Assessments. The SIGINTERS know so much about their targets				
they put out a great product.				
Foreign Partners: Second Party Partners are historic from WWII – US, UK, AUS (NZ).				
Their underlying strategy with them is to be "YESFORN" instead of "NOFORN" – they are				
integrated into each others' missions and spaces. They have the "trust me" cards and trade				
people routinely. 9/11 Classified Information				
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	Mr. Black said it's very			
unique and the people are very talented.				
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What was the NSA strategy on terrorism?	The analytic core was			
not touched during transformation so that was not the problem befor				
transformation did not disrupt collection on CT. NSA collects every	day and they are always			
practicing for a crisis. They have a large ability to surge and we do, recounted that the attack against Iraq was so long in coming, that wh				
DIRNSA and Deputy had nothing to do; they had had time to set up				
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On 9/11 the DIRNSA and Deputy had just finished a meetir				
the office passed the television and the secretary said an airplane had just hit the WTT. Black remarked that this was a "horrible accident" and both the DIR and Deputy were watching the TV				
	o they called security right			
away. They decided the one irreplaceable asset NSA has is people,	so they should evacuate all			
non-essentials. They kept the CT people but they are on the outer edge of the building				
so they set up to move them closer to The Director and Deputy moved to the NSOC. NSA did not have a COOP but they have lots of				
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buildings around the area so they were not afraid of not having a place to go - they wanted to protect their people first. By the time the Pentagon was hit they had taken all their security measures and NSOC was calling all customers to keep continuity and to keep them up to date on what was happening in Washington. The national SIGINT held up, no operations were interrupted or crashed. The Foreign partners called DIRNSA to ask how they could help. Mr. Black said the Deputy is really the COO [not the SID?] – so he worked augmentation issues. The DIRNSA is like the CEO and he called all the national leadership. They also got Harry Gitanes, the Senior Acquisition Executive, in to work with industry partners who came forward to help immediately. (U) Mr. Black said that 9/11 was his last day at work before he was supposed to go on leave. They had previously taken all their grandchildren to NYC and to the WTT except one set. On 9/12 he was supposed to take the remaining grandchildren to NYC and to the WTT. (U) NSA is healthy with the last money they were given. Their slush-fund is gone though. Spending the money effectively is the big challenge. They also can hire 500 new people per year. Now that the "dot coms" have crashed there are high-tech people to hire [linguists?]. ADCI/C, Charlie Allen: Mr. Black said, "We hear each other". He thinks highly of Allen and the ADCI/A&P, Mark Lowenthal. He said, though, that the IC is not focused. Before 9/11 the priority was really The USDI is the same as ASD/C3I was before. NSA lives in both worlds and DoD is the same as any customer like the State Department and the others. NSA's product doesn't go to just one customer (the one requesting); that was also a lesson learned from the Nixon era. They are a service organization. They became a Combat Service Agency and it only took 18 months. They did not know about the invasion planning because they were not part of the JCS alert system. So NSA asked how they could get on, and were told they had to be a CSA. He considers NSA a truly "national" organization. He has always had two masters so he listens to DCI and CMS. (U) Short discussion of NSPD-5. (U) When NSA was still all about Foreign Intelligence and Russians he was studying about the digital age. Charles Perce was a Pragmatist and Philosopher who was writing about chaos. He studied at the Santa Fe Institute.

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